Something from (almost) nothing: Buildup of object memory from forgettable single fixations

We can recognize thousands of individual objects in scores of familiar settings, and yet we see most of them only through occasional glances that are quickly forgotten. How do we come to recognize any of these objects? Here, we show that when objects are presented intermittently for durations of single fixations, the originally fleeting memories become gradually stabilized, such that, after just eight separated fixations, recognition memory after half an hour is as good as during an immediate memory test. However, with still shorter presentation durations, memories take more exposures to stabilize. Our results thus suggest that repeated glances suffice to remember the objects of our environment

fMRI Evidence for a Dual Process Account of the Speed-Accuracy Tradeoff in Decision-Making

Background: The speed and accuracy of decision-making have a well-known trading relationship: hasty decisions are more prone to errors while careful, accurate judgments take more time. Despite the pervasiveness of this speed-accuracy tradeoff (SAT) in decision-making, its neural basis is still unknown. Methodology/Principal Findings: Using functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) we show that emphasizing the speed of a perceptual decision at the expense of its accuracy lowers the amount of evidence-related activity in lateral prefrontal cortex. Moreover, this speed-accuracy difference in lateral prefrontal cortex activity correlates with the speedaccuracy difference in the decision criterion metric of signal detection theory. We also show that the same instructions increase baseline activity in a dorso-medial cortical area involved in the internal generation of actions. Conclusions/Significance: These findings suggest that the SAT is neurally implemented by modulating not only the amount of externally-derived sensory evidence used to make a decision, but also the internal urge to make a response. We propose that these processes combine to control the temporal dynamics of the speed-accuracy trade-off in decisionmaking

Grasping Kinematics from the Perspective of the Individual Digits: A Modelling Study

Grasping is a prototype of human motor coordination. Nevertheless, it is not known what determines the typical movement patterns of grasping. One way to approach this issue is by building models. We developed a model based on the movements of the individual digits. In our model the following objectives were taken into account for each digit: move smoothly to the preselected goal position on the object without hitting other surfaces, arrive at about the same time as the other digit and never move too far from the other digit. These objectives were implemented by regarding the tips of the digits as point masses with a spring between them, each attracted to its goal position and repelled from objects' surfaces. Their movements were damped. Using a single set of parameters, our model can reproduce a wider variety of experimental findings than any previous model of grasping. Apart from reproducing known effects (even the angles under which digits approach trapezoidal objects' surfaces, which no other model can explain), our model predicted that the increase in maximum grip aperture with object size should be greater for blocks than for cylinders. A survey of the literature shows that this is indeed how humans behave. The model can also adequately predict how single digit pointing movements are made. This supports the idea that grasping kinematics follow from the movements of the individual digits

Theoretical vs. empirical discriminability:the application of ROC methods to eyewitness identification

Abstract ᅟ Receiver operating characteristic (ROC) analysis was introduced to the field of eyewitness identification 5 years ago. Since that time, it has been both influential and controversial, and the debate has raised an issue about measuring discriminability that is rarely considered. The issue concerns the distinction between empirical discriminability (measured by area under the ROC curve) vs. underlying/theoretical discriminability (measured by d’ or variants of it). Under most circumstances, the two measures will agree about a difference between two conditions in terms of discriminability. However, it is possible for them to disagree, and that fact can lead to confusion about which condition actually yields higher discriminability. For example, if the two conditions have implications for real-world practice (e.g., a comparison of competing lineup formats), should a policymaker rely on the area-under-the-curve measure or the theory-based measure? Here, we illustrate the fact that a given empirical ROC yields as many underlying discriminability measures as there are theories that one is willing to take seriously. No matter which theory is correct, for practical purposes, the singular area-under-the-curve measure best identifies the diagnostically superior procedure. For that reason, area under the ROC curve informs policy in a way that underlying theoretical discriminability never can. At the same time, theoretical measures of discriminability are equally important, but for a different reason. Without an adequate theoretical understanding of the relevant task, the field will be in no position to enhance empirical discriminability

Selection in spatial working memory is independent of perceptual selective attention, but they interact in a shared spatial priority map

We examined the relationship between the attentional selection of perceptual information and of information in working memory (WM) through four experiments, using a spatial WM-updating task. Participants remembered the locations of two objects in a matrix and worked through a sequence of updating operations, each mentally shifting one dot to a new location according to an arrow cue. Repeatedly updating the same object in two successive steps is typically faster than switching to the other object; this object switch cost reflects the shifting of attention in WM. In Experiment 1, the arrows were presented in random peripheral locations, drawing perceptual attention away from the selected object in WM. This manipulation did not eliminate the object switch cost, indicating that the mechanisms of perceptual selection do not underlie selection in WM. Experiments 2a and 2b corroborated the independence of selection observed in Experiment 1, but showed a benefit to reaction times when the placement of the arrow cue was aligned with the locations of relevant objects in WM. Experiment 2c showed that the same benefit also occurs when participants are not able to mark an updating location through eye fixations. Together, these data can be accounted for by a framework in which perceptual selection and selection in WM are separate mechanisms that interact through a shared spatial priority map

The Quality of Response Time Data Inference: A Blinded, Collaborative Assessment of the Validity of Cognitive Models

Most data analyses rely on models. To complement statistical models, psychologists have developed cognitive models, which translate observed variables into psychologically interesting constructs. Response time models, in particular, assume that response time and accuracy are the observed expression of latent variables including 1) ease of processing, 2) response caution, 3) response bias, and 4) non-decision time. Inferences about these psychological factors, hinge upon the validity of the models’ parameters. Here, we use a blinded, collaborative approach to assess the validity of such model-based inferences. Seventeen teams of researchers analyzed the same 14 data sets. In each of these two-condition data sets, we manipulated properties of participants’ behavior in a two-alternative forced choice task. The contributing teams were blind to the manipulations, and had to infer what aspect of behavior was changed using their method of choice. The contributors chose to employ a variety of models, estimation methods, and inference procedures. Our results show that, although conclusions were similar across different methods, these "modeler’s degrees of freedom" did affect their inferences. Interestingly, many of the simpler approaches yielded as robust and accurate inferences as the more complex methods. We recommend that, in general, cognitive models become a typical analysis tool for response time data. In particular, we argue that the simpler models and procedures are sufficient for standard experimental designs. We finish by outlining situations in which more complicated models and methods may be necessary, and discuss potential pitfalls when interpreting the output from response time models